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DRAFTING AND ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
GEORGE A. RICHARDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Restrictive covenants not to compete in the same or similar
business in a specified area for a stated period of time have pro-
vided a steady source of litigation within the State of Wisconsin
and elsewhere. In fact, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has very
recently ruled on three cases involving such covenants. In two of
the three cases, the covenants were held unreasonable and unen-
forceable,' and in the other the reasonableness of the covenant was
not in issue.2 Many attorneys are called on to draft restrictive
covenants, and, with the current status of the law, this stage is of
primary importance. Because such a covenant restricts a person's
employment and ability to provide a livelihood, it has not been
favored in the eyes of the law.3 The common law and statutory
law have required strict construction of such agreements and re-
fused to enforce those of questionable reasonableness. Conse-
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1966; J.D., Marquette University, 1969; Note Editor,
Marquette Law Review, 1968-69; Law Clerk for the Hon. E. Harold Hallows, Chief Justice,
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1969-70; Associate, Tinkham, Smith, Bliss & Patterson, Wau-
sau, Wisconsin.
1. Estate of Schroeder, 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971); Holsen v. Marshall &
Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
2. Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 52 Wis. 2d 503, 190 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
3. See Little Rock Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Independent Linen Service Co., 237
Ark. 877, 377 S.W.2d 34 (1964); Marshall v. Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 339 P.2d 504 (1959);
Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963). See also Note,
Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 CAsE W. REs.
L. REv. 161, 168 (1964). However, in the recent case of Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 52 Wis.
2d 503, 190 N.W.2d 920 (1971), the Wisconsin court stated that an arrangement whereby
an older doctor took in a younger doctor and the younger doctor in return promised not to
open practice in the same area, should the arrangement terminate, was not disfavored. The
court evidently felt that this fact situation was not unique and not unusually unreasonable.
However, such an arrangement still must comply with the test of "reason"-a standard
which must be met by the proponent of the covenant. Consequently, while the court stated
that such covenants are not disfavored, they are to the extent that the freedom to contract
as one sees fit is subject to stringent court review. Further reason for the court's stating as
it did was that this was one of the very few cases in which no challenge of the covenant on
the ground that it was unreasonable was raised.
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quently, the drafter must be extremely careful.
There is a long line of cases4 and a statute5 in Wisconsin which
require an enforceable restrictive covenant not to compete after a
term of employment to be reasonably necessary for the protection
of the legitimate interests of the employer and, at the same time,
not oppressive or harsh on the employee or injurious to the inter-
ests of the general public. Wisconsin courts have always closely
construed the circumstances surrounding a restrictive covenant;
and the Wisconsin legislature, in 1957, further restricted such cove-
nants by enacting Wisconsin Statutes section 103.465, which pro-
vides:
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with
his employer or principal during the term of the employment or
agency, or thereafter, within a specified territory and during a
specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the em-
ployer or principal. Any such restrictive covenant imposing an
unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as
to so much of the covenant or performance as would be a reason-
able restraint.
The leading Wisconsin case, Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, de-
cided since the enactment of Section 103.465, referred to the stat-
ute and the five basic requirements necessary to enforcement of a
restrictive covenant agreement, which are as follows: (1) The
agreement must be necessary for the protection of the employer;
(2) it must provide a reasonable time period; (3) it must cover a
reasonable territory; (4) it must not be unreasonable as to the
employee; and (5) it must not be unreasonable as to the general
public.
What is reasonable and unreasonable will in all instances de-
pend on the facts. But the lawyer need not approach this subject
blindfolded. Like other courts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has,
throughout the years, dealt with the imprecise word, "reasonable,"
and has held a covenant unreasonable and illegal if it is greater
4. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265, 120 N.W.2d 126 (1963);
Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959); Journal Co. v. Bundy,
254 Wis. 390, 37 N.W.2d 89 (1949); Wisconsin Ice & Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W.
819 (1933); Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N.W. 567 (1933);
Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911).
5. WIs. STAT. § 103.465 (1969).
6. 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959).
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than is required for the protection of the person for whose benefit
the restraint is imposed, or if it imposes undue hardship on the
person restricted, or if the territory as defined in the contract was,
in fact, larger than the area covered by the defendant while em-
ployed by the plaintiff.7 The "reasonable" test is a constafnt head-
ache to a person drafting a covenant as he must always be thinking,
"Will a court consider this restriction valid under these facts?"
II. DRAFTING THE COVENANT
The drafter must keep in mind the facts of the various cases in
which a covenant has been deemed reasonable or unreasonable. He
must learn from the thinking and decisions of the court. In particu-
lar, the Slutsky case must be studied. Slutsky involved a covenant
which consisted of an agreement "not to re-enter the gasoline and
petroleum business in Milwaukee for a space of two (2) years,
either directly or indirectly."
A. Necessity
Necessity, duration of the covenant and territory encompassed,
and reasonableness as to the employee and the general public are
obviously dependent upon each other. In cases involving restrictive
covenants not to compete, an employer is attempting to retain
customers8 in a specified area or to protect his market and invest-
ment by keeping confidential information, such as trade or busi-
ness secrets,' away from competitors. The necessity of protecting
these assets is also the justification for the duration of the covenant
and the area encompassed by it.
The position or relationship of the employee with the employer
is fairly indicative of the latter's need for protection-a need which
is not uniform in all businesses and against all employees. How-
ever, in many situations, such as in the case of an expert salesman
or a sale of a business and resulting covenant not to compete by
the then owner, necessity can be readily and easily seen. Neverthe-
7. Cases cited note 4 supra. See also WIs. STAT. § 103.465 (1969); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 515 (1932).
8. For a discussion and cases regarding retention of existing customers as a factor
influencing an employer's need for protection, see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 162 (1955);
Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 71 (1955).
9. For a discussion and cases regarding trade or business secrets and confidential infor-
mation as a factor influencing the employer's need for protection, see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
94, 185 (1955); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 102 (1955).
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less, it should be remembered that the mere opportunity of the
employee to deal with his employer's customers does not determine
necessity, or the period of time or area which might be reasonable
in regard to protection of the employer. In contrast, the fact that
an employee has access to his employer's business methods, trade
secrets or other confidential information indicates the necessity of
the restraint for the employer's protection and generally forms a
basis for holding, rather consistently, that the covenant was rea-
sonably necessary. 0
The Wisconsin court in Slutsky found the restrictive covenant
necessary for the protection of the employer. Weighing such facts
as the defendant's personal relationship with the customers, the
employer's lack of contact with these customers, the highly com-
petitive industry, and the customers' identification and confidence
in the defendant, the court concluded that the defendant com-
manded such influence and contr'ol so as to enable him to take
away customers. The court went on to make the obvious observa-
tion that customers may be the single most important asset of most
businesses and, consequently, there was a legitimate interest to
protect.
B. Duration
As to the second element, the court determined the two-year
restriction to be reasonable. It noted that "reasonableness" in this
respect depends upon the length of time required to obliterate in
the minds of plaintiffs customers the identification formed during
the period of employment. The court discussed Eureka Laundry
Co. v. Long," wherein a two-year restraint was held reasonable
for a route salesman making frequent and regular customer con-
tacts. It concluded that two years, under the facts, was not an
unreasonable length of time in which to allow the plaintiff to pro-
tect his business from the defendant.
Thus, in Wisconsin, a restrictive covenant protecting an em-
ployer's customer contacts in a situation of necessity will be en-
forced provided it is no longer than two years in duration. Because
10. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1965). For
a discussion of trade secrets in relation to covenants not to compete, see Stedman, Trade
Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4 (1964).
11. 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911). Many other cases have held two years to be
reasonable under such circumstances. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 179 (1955).
[Vol. 55
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
the drafting of a covenant in excess of two years may call for a
ruling by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a drafter should have a
sound factual basis for exceeding two years.
The reasonable duration of a covenant protecting an employer
from confidential information gained by an employee *has not
gained the attention of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and, hence,
the drafter in this area will find himself more in the dark. Suffice
it to say, the cases in other jurisdictions vary as to reasonable
duration, but it appears that a restriction longer than two years is
more apt to be justified in regard to confidential information than
to salesmanship. The theory behind this distinction is that a sales-
man given two years protection is apt to gain the confidence of a
customer, while inside or confidential information could, depend-
ing on the type of information and business, be such that it could
be decisive for years. All in all, however, the drafter will be wise
to make the covenant even shorter than necessary-especially in
Wisconsin, where there is no real guideline as to what the court will
deem reasonable-or run the risk of having an unenforceable
agreement.
C. Territory
The third requirement of a valid covenant not to compete is
that the territory covered must be reasonable. As a general rule of
thumb, it can be said that a territorial restraint will be upheld as
reasonable "where the area of the restraint is limited to the terri-
tory in which the employee during the term of his employment.was
able to establish contact with his employer's customers. 1 2 This
territory will obviously vary with both the type of work performed
by the employee and the nature of the business involved.
Clearly, these two factors-the employee's position in his em-
ployer's organization and the nature of the employer's busi-
ness-determine to a very great degree the reasonableness of the
territorial extent of the restraint in so far as the latter is based
on the need of the employer to protect his customer contacts. For
this reason practically all the cases specifically mention the posi-
tion of the employee and the nature of the employer's business.' 3
The Wisconsin approach, as stated in Slutsky, has been one of
12. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 117 (1955).
13. Id. at 163.
19721
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upholding a restriction as reasonable if it is limited to such terri-
tory as constituted the employee's activities, and goes no further.
In Slutsky, for example, the court found reasonable a restriction
limited to seventy-five percent of the employee's sales and, hence,
confined to the area where the employee principally operated. On
the other hand, in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Balistrieri,4
the court found unreasonable a covenant which prohibited the
employee, who had confined his insurance-sales activity to within
Milwaukee County, from writing insurance anywhere the company
was licensed to operate. The restriction was deemed to be much
greater than that required for the employer's protection, imposing
an undue hardship upon the defendant. 5 In Wisconsin Ice & Coal
Co. v. Lueth,6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court again emphasized
the importance of the area covered by the employee. In this partic-
ular case, the covenant involved an area more extensive than that
in which the defendant had worked and, hence, was struck down.
Area alone, however, is not the sole consideration. As the court
pointed out, "The propriety of a terretorial restriction must be
considered in connection with the circumstances of the parties and
the activities of the employee."' 7 Also to be weighed in the determi-
nation as to reasonableness is the nature of the particular business
involved. 8
A reasonable area is more difficult to ascertain when the cove-
nant is designed to protect an employer from an ex-employee's
using trade or business secrets or confidential information. The
customer contact theory only protects the employer in the area in
which the employee was employed-while an area of restraint,
where the necessity for the covenant is based on confidential or
secret information, will be deemed reasonable if the area is
confined to the territory in which the employer in the prosecution
of his business makes use of the information. The drafter may,
however, have difficulty in protecting a planned area of expansion.
And, this very situation of potential expansion may be the primary
reason for the covenant. In Wisconsin the problem is acute due to
lack of authority on this subject.
14. 19 Wis. 2d 265, 120 N.W.2d 126 (1963).
15. Id. at 270-71, 120 N.W.2d at 129.
16. 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
17. Id. at 45, 250 N.W. at 820.
18. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d at 165, 98 N.W.2d at 420.
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It should also be noted that an employer may be entitled to
protection against an ex-employee's use of trade secrets even ab-
sent a contract. It has been held that an agreement to that effect
may be implied from the confidential relationship of employer-
employee. 9 The mere fact, however, that an ex-employee, possess-
ing trade secrets, accepts employment with a competitor is not
sufficient to warrant relief unless the facts are such so as to per-
suade a trier of fact' that the hiring was devious in itself.20 This
would place a very difficult burden on the former employer, to say
the least, and, consequently, a written agreement is far and away
the best procedure.
Further, much information an employee learns on the job will
be deemed general information and not secret or confidential ma-
terial, and, as to this, an employer will have no protection unless
there can be drafted an express agreement which will meet the
"reasonableness" test. A written agreement will ease the burden of
proof on a plaintiff in that it may eliminate the distinction between
secret information and general information, provided necessity for
the agreement can be shown.
D. Reasonableness as to Employee
As stated earlier, the fourth requirement of a valid covenant
not to compete is that it be reasonable as to the employee. To
illustrate, in the Slutsky case, the court took notice of the fact that
the defendant was not prevented from becoming a salesman or
proprietor of a different business or from engaging in any other
occupation. Weighing such factors as Slutsky's high school educa-
tion, his success as a salesman, and his ownership of real estate and
a home, the court concluded that even at age 40, without a college
degree, "no great hardship" would be imposed by requiring him
"to use his talents as a salesman in other fields of endeavor. ' 2 To
quote the court:
While the keeping of his promise may be inconvenient to the
defendant and may now be undesirable from his standpoint, it is
not unduly harsh or oppressive on him in relation to the relatively
greater harm to the employer if the covenant is not enforced. 22
19. See 42 Am. JuR. 2d, Injunctions § 112 (1969).
20. Id.




E. Reasonableness as to General Public
Finally, a valid covenant not to compete must be reasonable as
to the general public. Again turning to the Slutsky case as an
illustration, the court took notice of the interest of the public in
the employee's particular services and any possible stifling of com-
petition or creation of a monopoly. Concluding that whether the
defendant competed or not would have no effect on the public, as
there was no danger that the enforcement of the restrictive cove-
nant would result in the defendant's becoming a public charge,2
the court enforced the covenant.
The case from whence the public charge analogy stems is
Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring,24 which involved a disabled
and handicapped man who had delivered towels and linen for the
plaintiff but could not find other employment in 1933. It would
appear that this "public charge" test must be considered in terms
of this case, which was decided during the depression. It is doubtful
that a similar fact situation would arise today, and it is equally
doubtful that a restrictive covenant would be entered into in such
a situation wherein enforcement would cause a person to become
a public charge. In such a situation, there would seemingly be a
lack of necessity in the first instance. Consequently, one must
conclude that the court is being extremely liberal as to the require-
ment that the covenant be reasonable as to the general public.
F. Care in Drafting
As previously noted, if the covenant is unreasonable in any
respect, it is unenforceable in all respects. Therefore, the drafter
must be careful to be reasonable in all five aspects. Reasonable-
ness, of course, will depend on the facts and situation of the em-
ployee and the employer. But, a drafter would be well to provide
as follows:
Reason for Whereas this is a contract of employ-
Covenant ment 25 entered into to hire
to make sales to employer's customers,
23. Id. at 167, 98 N.W.2d at 421.
24. 210 Wis. 467, 246 N.W. 567 (1933).
25. In regard to a contract of employment, this clause should be included where applica-
ble so that the proponent is not met with the argument that the agreement lacks considera-
tion and is unenforceable. In any event, it is best to state the consideration so that this issue
does not arise.
[Vol. 55
1972] COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 249
which involves contacting said custom-
ers, developing customers and identify-
ing with and gaining confidence of said
customers by and
Whereas it is understood between em-
ployer and employee that employer's
customers and customer relation is one
of employer's most important assets,26
Noncompete It is hereby agreed that if employee,
Provision voluntarily or involuntarily, terminates
Area or has his employment terminated, he
agrees not to compete, directly or indi-
rectly, within the area which constituted
the field or area of his activities at the
time of termination2 and,
Duration It is further agreed that said noncompete
agreement contained herein shall run for
a period of two years from the date of
termination.
The necessity for the covenant must be determined by the draft-
er before he attempts to consider the restriction as to time and
area. Consequently, the drafter would be wise to premise the actual
covenant with the reasons for it. After considering this matter and
writing the premise, the restrictions as to time and area fall natu-
rally into line. However, the factors of reasonableness as to the
employee and general public are totally dependent upon the fact
situation. Consequently, a drafter is unable to compose a covenant
that can assure freedom from problems in these areas.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVENANT
A. Discovery of Competition by an Ex-Employee
After employment has been terminated for one reason or an-
other, there are numerous methods of disguised competition which
26. There is a presumption that a necessity for protection, present when the contract is
entered into, continues.
27. It might prove beneficial to a drafter to insert the clause, "at the time of termination
and within one year prior to termination," or other clause to this effect, so as to protect
the employer from an employee's use of expertise gained prior to termination, but in a job
not performed by the employee at termination.
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may be attempted to avoid the restrictive covenant. The most
blatant, and one without disguise at all, is that of striking out on
one's own or joining a competitor and competing in the same area,
engaging in the same business. However, in many instances, the
competition will not be so obvious. The ex-employee will attempt
to hid behind the veil of incorporation in one manner or another.
It may be as simple an attempt as forming a corporation with his
own capital and hiring others to do the work he did for his prior
employer, or it may even go as far as having the employee's wife
form a corporation and run the business herself, with the husband
attempting to create the illusion that he is making a living from
other products and customers. This latter situation may be avoided
by having the wife also sign a separate covenant not to compete.
It is because of the inventiveness of the human mind and the
numerous schemes available by use of the corporate veil that the
covenant should provide against competition either "direct or indi-
rect." In this regard, it must be remembered that the ex-employer
will have the burden of proving the competition, which most likely
will be somehow disguised. There will usually be considerable cir-
cumstantial evidence, including customer contacts, financing
agreements, purchases from suppliers, or work on development of
a product or source of supply. But in some circumstances the
evidence of competition may be difficult to find and, if found,
deemed indirect or not significantly important so as to constitute
proof of actual competition. By including indirect competition in
the prohibitive agreement the employer may reduce somewhat the
difficult burden of proof.
B. Seeking an Injunction
Assuming that an employer has determined that an ex-
employee is competing, the question becomes how to enforce the
covenant. One method would be to serve a summons and com-
plaint requesting a permanent injunction and damages and to seek
a temporary injunction by bringing on an order to show cause with
an affidavit stating that there will "likely" be irreparable harm if
a temporary injunction is not issued.2 8 In the Slutsky case, the trial
28. WIS. STAT. § 268.02(1) (1969):
When it appears from his pleading that a party is entitled to judgment and any
part thereof consists in restraining some act, the commission or continuance of which
during the litigation would injure him, or when during the litigation it shall appear
[Vol. 55
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court granted a temporary injunction and later a permanent in-
junction. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision,
stating:
It is reasonable to assume that actual damage was prevented
because a temporary injunction was granted within ten days after
the defendant's company commenced business. In seeking an
injunction it is not necessary to provethat the plaintiff has suf-
fered irreparable damage but only that he is likely to suffer such
damage.2 9
Without question, the burden of both pleading and proving the
necessity of a restrictive covenant and its reasonableness rests upon
the party attempting to enforce the covenant °.3 The nature of the
employment relationship and business must be pleaded, and the
plaintiff must be prepared to prove the reasonableness in all as-
pects. Further, a plaintiff must expect to be met with strong argu-
ments against the granting of the temporary restraining order and,
quite likely, will be met with a demurrer based on reasonableness
of the covenant .or some other ground.3
C. Use of Conspiracy Theory
Where an ex-employee is hiding behind another corporation or
person, the plaintiff may, to get around the restrictive covenant,
allege a conspiracy or concert of activity. It has long been held that
a conspiracy to breach a contract is actionable,32 and that an
individual may be liable for damages done in pursuance of a con-
spiracy, despite the fact that if not done within such a scheme, the
person would not have been liable. This rule of law would be
particularly applicable to the situation wherein a wife sets up a
corporation competing with her husband's ex-employer or wherein
some other person or entity attempts to take advantage of the ex-
employee's expertise developed while on his prior job.
In civil actions where conspiracy is alleged, the burden rests on
the plaintiff to establish proof of such allegations by clear and
that a party is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering some
act to be done in violation of the rights of another party and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual, a temporary injunction may be granted to restrain such act.
29. 8 Wis. 2d at 168, 98 N.W.2d at 421-22 (emphasis added).
30. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 138, 70 N.W.2d 585, 587-88
(1955).
31. See Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 52 Wis. 2d 503, 190 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
32. Cranston v. Bluhm, 42 Wis. 2d 425, 147 N.W.2d 337 (1969).
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satisfactory evidence, the middle burden of proof.33 Although
such proof is always difficult, a plaintiff has some help in that a
finding may be inferred from established facts and circumstantial
evidence.34 Indeed, in an action for damages for conspiracy no
express agreement between the defendants need be shown-a con-
currence in a common purpose is sufficient.3 5
One word of caution. At the hearing on the order to show
cause, where the plaintiff is seeking a temporary injunction, it is
wise to call witnesses and provide other evidence of the concert or
conspiracy; otherwise, the court will, in all probability, only re-
strict the ex-employee, and no one else, or not issue the temporary
injunction in the first instance. In both situations, this would cause
very untoward consequences were the restrictive covenant for a
short, but reasonable, time-as, for instance, two years. The cove-
nant would continue to run without the plaintiffs getting its bene-
fit. This may well necessitate a motion to advance the date of trial,
pursuant to section 270.12(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, and later,
at trial, the seeking of an injunction for the remaining time of the
covenant running from the date of judgment."
The bringing of an action based on conspiracy or concert of
action may necessitate the inclusion of such corporation or other
person in the suit. Such inclusion may prove very beneficial with
respect to monetary damages-the next facet of enforcement re-
quiring examination.
D. Damages
After all other burdens and obstacles have been met, the plain-
tiff finally gets a break. Obviously, he is not able to prove his
damages for a breach of a covenant not to compete with mathe-
33. Eiden v. Hovde, 260 Wis. 573, 51 N.W.2d 531 (1952); Lange v. Heckel, 171 Wis.
59, 175 N.W. 788 (1920); Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
34. South Side Lumber Co. v. John Eller Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 399, 154 N.W. 621
(1915); Patnode v. Westenhaver, 114 Wis. 460, 90 N.W. 467 (1902).
35. Norvell v. McGraw-Edison Co., 316 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Cox v. Cox,
259 Wis. 259, 48 N.W.2d 508 (1951); Ziegler v. Hustisford Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 238 Wis.
238, 298 N.W. 610 (1941).
36. It would appear that a permanent injunction restraining the individual for the length
of the covenant commencing with the date of judgment should be granted along with
damages for loss of profits. After all, an injunction is based on equity and the only way the
agreed benefit can be achieved is through enforcement for the period specified in the
covenant along with damages resulting from the improper competition.
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matical precision or exactness. Precisely how much business, how
many clients, and how much profit have been lost and will be lost
in the future cannot be known. The courts, in general, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in particular, have adopted a very lib-
eral rule of proof of damages to meet this problem. The wrong-
doers will neither be permitted to profit by their own wrongful acts
nor be permitted to object to proof that is not based upon a mathe-
matical certainty. To illustrate, in Novo Industrial Corp. v.
Nissen3 7 after selling a crane business with a five-year noncom-
pete agreement, the former owner and general manager established
a competing business in the same line of machinery, in violation
of the agreement. Faced with the issue of how to assess and prove
damages by reason of such violation, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court disclaimed any need for mathematical accuracy and held it
sufficient if damages could be estimated with a reasonable degree
of certainty. To quote the court:
The standard used by the trial court to ascertain damages is not
perfect. But many damage measures are inaccurate to a certain
extent. Under the particular circumstances of this case the trial
court set the damages as reasonably, fairly, and certainly as it
could. It did not err in determining damages. Moreover, in its
evaluation of damages the trial court undoubtedly acted in ac-
cordance with the well-established rule that by having caused the
uncertainty of proof, the contract breacher is precluded from
demanding a more precise measure of damages."
Because the amount of the award is an issue of fact facing the
court, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to introduce into evidence
all available data covering the financial condition of the employer,
the ex-employee, and any persons or corporations alleged to have
been conspiring to breach the contract. With such data, the court
must determine the value of the customers or suppliers lost as a
result of the breach and the diminution of profits. 9 Although it is
sufficient if there is a certain standard or fixed method by which
profits sought to be recovered may be estimated with a fair degree
of accuracy," any attempt to reach even such a low standard is
37. 30 Wis. 2d 123, 140 N.W.2d 280 (1966). It should be noted that the issue of
reasonable time was not rasied.
38. Id. at 132-33, 140 N.W.2d at 285.
39. Id. at 130-31, 140 N.W.2d at 284. See Pressure Cast Products Corp. v. Page, 261
Wis. 197, 51 N.W.2d 898 (1952). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331 (1932).
40. See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 172 (1965).
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fraught with difficulties. For example, at the time of trial, a plain-
tiff may be operating at its productivity of the two years prior to
termination of employment and breach of the contract; however,
that plaintiff might possibly have enjoyed greater sales and profits
had not the employee decided to compete. Further, any compari-
son of profits made prior to and following breach of the contract
must include a consideration of the normal increase in business
which might have been expected in light of past developments and
existing conditions."
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, it can be said that in the area of covenants not to
compete, primary emphasis should be placed upon the drafting
stage. Protected by a covenant which is reasonable as to time,
place, the public, and the employee, and which grants no more
protection to the employer than that reasonably necessary, an
employer may prevent possible loss of customers, suppliers, and
profits as a result of action on the part of a former employee. In
enforcing such a covenant, the plaintiff's attorney must pierce the
veil of activity conducted by the defendant and determine whether
it, in fact, involves the prohibited competition. If so, injunctive or
monetary relief may be sought. Although the task of proving dam-
ages is never easy and the amount recoverable cannot be accurately
predicted, upon proof of breach of an enforceable covenant, assis-
tance from the courts, via liberal rules, might aid in the successful
conclusion of a noncompete case.
41. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 90 (1966).
